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SELECTED TITLE ISSUES IN TITLE EXAMINATION 
I. TEXAS PROPERTY 101
(A) Separate Property
Section 3.001 of the Texas Family Code provides that:
A spouse's separate property consists of: (1) the property owned or claimed 
by the spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during 
marriage by gift, devise or descent; and, (3) the recovery for personal injury 
sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for lose of earning 
capacity during marriage.
Each spouse has the sole management, control and disposition of his or her 
separate property. See Section 3.101 of the Texas Family Code.
(B) Community Property
Section 3.002 of the Texas Family Code provides that:
Community property consists of the property, other than separate
property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.
Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is 
presumed to be community property. The degree of proof necessary to establish 
that property is separate property is clear and convincing evidence. See Section 
3.003 of the Texas Family Code.
W hile these definitions appear simple, they have given rise to a lot of 
litigation. The annotations contained in the code alone are about 150 pages.
Generally, income from separate property is community property. But royalty 
income is held to be a sale of the property, that is a sale of the corpus and is not 
income. Royalties from separate property is separate property. The same is true 
for lease bonuses. However, delay rentals are likened to rent and is community 
property.
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(C) Inception of Title
Under this rule, Texas courts determine the separate or community nature of 
property at the time of acquisition. Inception of title occurs when a party first has the 
right of claim to property by virtue of which title is finally vested. Weirzchula v. 
Weirzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.App. 1981).
It is well established that a claim to real property can arise before the legal 
title or evidence of title has been attained. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510 44 
S.W .2d 281 (Tex. 1898). In other words, if you acquire a contract giving you the 
right to acquire land before you are married, the property will be your separate 
property even if the condition of the contract is not met until during marriage. In the 
Lambert case, the earnest money date was prior to the date of marriage and the 
court held that the claim of right to the property occurred before marriage and 
therefore, was the separate property of the person to whom the land was conveyed.
If land is conveyed to you under a vendor's lien deed in which you pay part of 
the money down with the remainder to be paid over a number of years and you 
subsequently get married and community property funds are used to pay off the 
mortgage, the land would still be your separate property.
A presumption that property is community estate arises when the note is 
signed after the marriage. This is because a debt acquired by either spouse during 
marriage is presumptively a community debt. However, this presumption is also 
rebuttable. If the lendor agrees only to look to the separate property of one of the 
spouses for the security of the debt, the proof will rebut the presumption.
(D) Management, Control And Disposition of Marital Property
Section 3.102 of the Texas Family Code provides as follows:
(a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole management, 
control, and disposition of the community property that he or she 
would have owned if single, including but not limited to:
(1) personal earnings;
(2) revenue from separate property;
(3) recoveries for personal injuries; and,
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(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all 
property subject to his or her sole management, control, 
and disposition.
(b) If community property subject to the sole management, control, 
and disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined with 
community property subject to the sole management, control and 
disposition of the other spouse, then the mixed or combined 
community property is subject to the joint management, control, 
and disposition of the spouses, unless the spouses provide 
otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (a) of this section, the 
community property is subject to the joint management, control 
and disposition of the husband and wife, unless the spouses 
provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other 
agreement.
(E) Protection of Third Persons
Section 3.104 of the Texas Family Code provides as follows:
(a) During marriage, property is presumed to be subject to the sole 
management, control, and disposition of a spouse if it is held in his or 
her name, as shown by muniment, contract, deposit of funds, or other 
evidence of ownership, or if it is in his or her possession and is not 
subject to such evidence of ownership.
(b) A third party dealing with a spouse is entitled to rely (as against the 
other spouse or anyone claiming from that spouse) on that spouse's 
authority to deal with the property if:
1. the property is presumed to be subject to the sole management, 
control, and disposition of the spouse; and,
2. the person dealing with the spouse:
A. is not a party to a fraud upon the other spouse or another 
person; and,
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B. does not have actual or constructive notice of the spouse's lack 
of authority.
For example, if a deed names one person as the grantee and that person is 
married, as to third parties, the property is presumed to be subject to the sole 
management, control and disposition of the spouse whose name appears as the 
grantee in the deed. In such a case, a third party, such as a lessee, is entitled to rely 
on the spouse's authority as long as the third party is not a party to a fraud upon the 
other spouse or another person and does not have actual or constructive notice of 
the spouse's lack of authority.
What constitutes actual or constructive notice of the spouse's lack of authority 
has not been the subject of a lot of litigation. However, it has been held that where 
a bank president had actual knowledge that the wife had refused to sign a note and 
a deed of trust covering lands acquired as community property but held only in the 
husband's name, this was sufficient to put the bank on notice of the husband’s lack 
of authority to encumber the wife's interest in the tract. Williams v. Portland State 
Bank (Civ.App. 1974) 514 S.W.2d 124 error granted, dismissed.
However, the mere fact that the third party knew that the person was married 
does not, of itself, overcome this sole management presumption. See Johnson v. 
Cumming, 616 F2d 1069 (1979). Further, even if the spouse in whose name the 
deed was not executed joins in subsequent instruments affecting the title, such as 
executing deeds of trust or mechanic's liens, this is insufficient to show joint 
management. See Fajkus v. First National Bank o f Giddings, 735 S.W .2d 882 
(Tex.App.-Austin, 1987) and Thomas v. Rhodes, 701 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.App.-1986, 
writ re f'd, n.r.e.) cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 ,107  S.Ct. 1348, 94 L.Ed.2d 519 1987.
(F) Homestead
What can constitute constructive notice that property is not subject to the sole 
management and control of the spouse in whose name the deed appears? The most 
obvious example which comes to mind is when the husband and wife are occupying 
the property as homestead. Homesteads in Texas are vigorously protected and 
have a special place in the law.
Prior to January 1 ,  1998, Article 16, Section 50 of the Texas State Constitution 
provided as follows:
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Sec. 50. The homestead of a family, or of a single adult 
person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the 
payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof, or a part 
of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and 
material used in constructing improvements thereon, and in this last 
case only when the work and material are contracted for in writing, with 
the consent of both spouses, in the case of a family homestead, given 
in the same manner as is required in making a sale and conveyance of 
the homestead; nor may the owner or claimant of the property claimed 
as homestead, if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the 
consent of the other spouse, given in such manner as may be 
prescribed by law. No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the 
homestead shall ever be valid, except for the purchase money therefor, 
or improvements made thereon, as hereinbefore provided, whether 
such mortgage, or trust deed, or other lien, shall have been created by 
the owner alone, or together with his or her spouse, in case the owner 
is married. All pretended sales of the homestead involving any 
condition of defeasance shall be void. This amendment shall become 
effective upon its adoption.
Effectively, the only liens which were valid on a homestead were:
(1) Purchase money mortgages or liens;
(2) Liens for taxes due on the homestead; or,
(3) Mechanic’s liens for constructing improvements on the homestead but 
only if these latter liens were in writing with the consent of both 
spouses.
Effective January 1, 1998, the Texas Constitution was amended to provide 
that in certain circumstances, liens created under a partition or for refinancing are 
effective against homesteads if the terms of the constitution are complied with.
As stated in the interpretive commentary to this Article, the homestead 
exemption was a Texas creation. The direct cause of the law was the United States 
Panic of 1837 and the ensuing depression during which numerous families lost 
homes and farms through foreclosures. In the Republic of Texas, business became 
stagnant, money scarce and credit unobtainable. Most Texans were in debt. The 
homestead exemption was looked upon as a necessary measure to offset the 
economic danger to Texans and Texas. It had a three-fold purpose:
SELECTED TITLE ISSUES IN TITLE EXAMINATION PAGE 5
(1) To preserve the integrity of the family as the basic element of social 
organization, and, incidentally, to encourage colonialization for in a 
frontier society each pioneer family was of definite value to the 
community;
(2) To provide the debtor with a home for his family and some means to 
support them and to recoup his economic losses so as to prevent the 
family from becoming a burdensome charge upon the public; and,
(3) To retain in pioneers the feeling of freedom and sense of independence 
which was deemed necessary to the continued existence of democratic 
institutions.
Section 5.001 in Texas Family Code provides as follows:
Whether the homestead is the separate property of either 
spouse or community property, neither spouse may sell, 
convey or encumber it without the joinder of the other 
spouse except as provided in this subchapter or by other 
rules of law.
The exceptions provided in Chapter 5 of the Family Code include the 
following:
(1) If the homestead is the separate property of a spouse, that spouse may
file a sworn petition that gives a description of the property, states the 
facts that make it desirable for the spouse to sell, convey or encumber 
the homestead without the joinder of the other spouse and alleges that 
the other spouse:
(a) is incapacitated, whether judicially declared incapacitated or not;
(b) disappears and his or her location remains unknown to the 
petitioning spouse;
(c) permanently abandons the homestead and the petitioning 
spouse; or,
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(d) permanently abandons the homestead and the spouses are 
permanently separated, or has been reported by an executive 
department of the United States to be a prisoner of war or 
missing on public service of the United States
(2) This exceptions require a court order and the provisions of Chapter 5 
of the Family Code must be complied with.
If you obtain an oil and gas lease covering homestead property from only the 
spouse who is presumed to have the sole management and control thereof or from 
the spouse who owns the property as his or her sole property, the lease will be 
inoperative as long as the property remains the homestead of the lessors unless the 
other spouse ratifies the lease or is otherwise estopped from denying its validity. 
See Grissom v. Anderson 79 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1935).
In the Grissom case, eight brothers and sisters, who were the joint owners of 
a tract of land, executed an oil and gas lease. Two of the joint owners, Frank and 
Taylor occupied the land as their homestead with their wives and families. The 
interest of Frank and Taylor was their separate property. The wives did not join in 
the execution of this lease even though they knew all about the lease and were 
willing to execute it if the parties thought it was necessary to make it effective.
The court in that case held that it was unquestioned that the lease was valid 
and binding on all parties signing same except Taylor and Frank and their wives. 
Without the signatures of the wives of Taylor and Frank, the mineral lease was 
inoperative as long as the land constituted their homestead. Under the law, the 
power to make it operative as to their interest rested exclusively with them.
However, the court noted that after the execution of the lease, Taylor and 
Frank and their wives had executed various royalty deeds which stated that the 
deeds were subject to the lease. The Texas Supreme Court held that by their acts 
in executing the royalty deeds, they gave the lease life. In other words, their acts in 
executing the royalty deed and making the deed subject to the lease constituted a 
ratification of the lease.
In order to effectuate a ratification, the Texas courts have held that there must 
be a writing duly acknowledged by the non-joining spouse. The acceptance of 
royalty proceeds under a lease does not effect the ratification or, considered alone, 
constitute an estoppel. See Crews v. General Crude Oil Company (Civ.App. 1956) 
287 S.W .2d 243.
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In the Crews case, supra, the wife had signed a lease but argued that her 
signature was not properly acknowledged. Her testimony, in essence, w as that the 
landman had come to her house, she had signed the lease and the landman had 
then taken it elsewhere for the acknowledgment. The landman and the notary both 
testified that they went together to the wife's house and that she signed the lease  
there and then acknowledged her execution of the lease as the law requires. The 
jury believed the wife and found that her signature was not acknowledged.
Two years after the execution of the lease, the lessee's successors drilled a 
well and some 22 months after the well was drilled, suit was filled in a trespass to 
try title.
The court stated that by acceptance of the royalties, the wife w as not estopped 
to deny the validity of the lease. Further, the mere inaction and silence on her part 
in watching the well drilled without any affirmative representations or suppression 
of facts was not of itself enough to hold the wife was estopped from denying the 
validity of the lease.
However, the evidence showed that the lessees had fenced off the area where 
the well was located with a locked gate to which the husband and wife had no 
access. As to that part of the lease which had been so fenced off, the court found 
that the husband and wife had abandoned that portion as their homestead. 
However, the lease was not abandoned as to that portion of the lands covered by the 
lease which were outside this fenced area. All facts determine the outcome.
At the time the Crews case, supra, was decided, Texas law required that in 
order to be a valid acknowledgment of the wife, a notary would have to take the wife 
apart from her husband and, in private, fully explain the document to the wife. The  
wife would then have to acknowledge her signature to the document, declare she 
had willingly signed it for the purposes and consideration expressed in the document 
and that she did not wise to retract it. If a spouse does not sign a  lease (or other 
instrument) covering a homestead, it will be ineffective. In this case, you will be 
forced to look to other factors and prove the document is binding on the non- 
signatory spouse.
In sum, when dealing with community property, it always better to have a 
husband and wife both execute a lease regardless of how record title stands. This 
is imperative where the property is the homestead of the husband and wife. Anytime 
you are leasing a person’s mineral interest and that person owns the surface, or an 
interest therein, you should check to see if the property is a homestead of that 
person. However, if the property is not the homestead of the husband and wife and
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the land was conveyed to only one spouse, then a lease taken from that spouse will 
be valid to bind the entire community interest unless you are  a party to a fraud or 
have actual or constructive notice that said property is not subject to sole 
management and control of the spouse in whose name the deed appears.
In addition, even if property is separate property of one spouse, if the land is 
homestead property, both spouses must sign the lease.
II. THE EFFECTS OF RECORDING OR, SHOULD I RECORD ON A LEASE BY
LEASE BASIS OR WAIT UNTIL MY AREA IS SECURE AND FILE THEM
ALL AT ONCE?
Texas Property Code §13.001 states that:
(a) A  conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a 
mortgage or deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent 
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless the 
instrument has been acknowledged, sworn to, or proved, and filed for 
record as required by law.
(b) The unrecorded instrument is binding upon a party to the instrument, 
upon the party’s heirs and upon a subsequent purchaser who does not 
pay a valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument.
Company landmen prefer to acquire substantial blocks of acreage and record 
the leases all at once in order to preclude competitors from identifying their area of 
interest as long as possible. Occasionally, a lessor from whom a company landman 
has obtained a lease will execute a subsequent lease to a different company and this 
different company will claim the status of a bona fide purchaser and assert the 
protection offered in the statute quoted above, regardless of which lease is filed first.
The plain language of the statute, assuming the fact intensive elements of a 
bona fide purchaser are present, supports the second lessor’s position, regardless 
of filing date. It appears our statute is a pure “notice” statute. In other words, if the 
first purchaser does not record before the sale to the second purchaser, the second 
purchaser prevails (assuming he is an innocent purchaser for value) regardless of 
who filed their instrument first and even if the second purchaser never files his 
instrument. This is based on the theory that the first purchaser could prevent his loss 
by promptly recording his instrument and is at fault for not doing so.
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The existing case law supports the pure notice interpretation. In Penny v. 
Adams, 420 S.W.2d 820 (Crt. Civ. App. - Tyler, 1967, writ re f'd), the facts were 
essentially as follows:
(1) A owned the lands.
(2) By Royalty Deed dated September 1 9 ,  1945, A conveyed to “B" a 1/2 
non-participating royalty for 20 years and as long thereafter as 
production was had. This deed was not filed for record until February 
6, 1954.
(3) By Deed dated February 11, 1954, A conveyed all her undivided 
interest in the lands to “C". This deed was not filed until February 24, 
1954.
(4) “B" brings suit against “C" and his successors to recover the royalty 
interest conveyed to him in the Deed dated September 19, 1945, 
referenced above. There was apparently a producing well on this 
property which would have perpetuated the term royalty interest.
At the trial court level, it was found that "C" had paid a valuable consideration 
for the Deed executed on February 1 ,  1954, and had no notice of the prior Deed from 
“A” to “B" dated September 19, 1945. The trial court found “C" was an innocent 
purchaser for value and rendered judgment that “B" take nothing.
While “B’s” point of appeal was that the deed to “C" was a quitclaim deed 
(because it was only of “A ’s” undivided interest) and that “C" could not claim being 
an innocent purchaser, the Tyler Appellate Court found that “C" was protected as a 
bona fide purchaser and that “C” was an innocent purchaser for value. The trial 
court’s judgment was sustained.
In another Tyler appellate case, Reposa v. Johnson, 693 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. 
App. - Tyler, 1985, writ re f'd, n.r.e.), the facts were essentially the same as above. 
While the Appellate Court held in this case that “C”, the second purchaser, did not 
sustain his burden of showing he was an innocent purchaser for value, the Court did 
state that, if an affirmative finding had been made that “C" had paid a valuable 
consideration without notice of the instrument vesting “B” with her title, it would mean 
the conveyance to “C" would not have been affected by “B's” instrument and "C" 
would have prevailed.
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A somewhat recent case re-visits the definition of a bona fide purchaser, 
Colvin v. Alta Mesa Resources, Inc., 920 S.W .2d 688 (Tex. App. - Houston, First 
District, 1996). A bona fide purchaser is one who makes a good faith purchase of 
real property for a valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of an 
outstanding equity or an adverse interest or title. The elements essential to a bona 
fide purchaser purchase are (1) payment of valuable consideration; (2 ) absence of 
notice; and (3) good faith. All of these elements are fact intensive and the failure of 
any one will defeat the claim. W e could talk for days about the disputes that have 
arisen under this statute because of the fact-intensive nature of these elements.
Most company landmen, when questioned by management over the failure of 
a lease due to this statute, will respond that occasional loss of an oil and gas lease 
to a bona fide purchaser under this statute is preferable to recording leases 
immediately and letting the registry readers compete from the date the first lease is 
filed.
III. OIL AND GAS LEASES FROM PARTIES IN REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITIES
(A) Receivership
(i) Mineral Interests
In Texas, a person owning or claiming an undivided mineral interest in land, 
or an undivided leasehold interest in land, can bring an action to appoint a receiver 
to lease the mineral interest of a person who owns or claims an undivided mineral 
interest in the same property. The defendant for whom the receiver is sought must 
be a person whose residence or identity is unknown and has not paid taxes on their 
interest during the five year period preceding the filing of the action. See Section 
64.091, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
The plaintiff in this action must allege and prove that he has m ade a diligent 
but unsuccessful effort to locate the defendant and will suffer substantial damage or 
injury unless a receiver is appointed.
Notice of the lawsuit must be served on the defendant by publication in 
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither the applicant nor the 
receiver is required to post bond.
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As ordered by the court, the receiver can execute and deliver to the lessee a 
mineral lease on the outstanding undivided mineral interest, execute an assignment 
of the outstanding undivided leasehold interest and enter into a unitization 
agreement authorized by the Texas Railroad Commission. Leases can contain 
pooling clauses of no more than 160 acres for an oil well or 640 acres for a gas well, 
each with a 10% tolerance, or into a unit that substantially conforms to a larger unit 
prescribed or permitted by governmental rule. The money consideration paid for the 
lease or assignment is paid into the registry of the District Clerk’s Office before the 
receiver executes the instrument. The money is applied to the costs accruing in the 
case and the balance, if any, is retained for the use and benefit of the defendant.
(ii) Royalty Interests
Effective August 30, 1999, a receiver can be appointed for a royalty interest 
owned by a non-resident or absent defendant in a tract of land. See Section 64.093  
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This statute is similar to Section 
64.091 discussed above but applies to a royalty interest. The Receiver under this 
statute, as ordered by the court, can ratify a mineral lease executed by a person 
owning an undivided mineral interest in the property, ratify a pooling agreement 
executed by a person owning an undivided mineral or leasehold interest in the 
property or enter into a unitization agreement authorized by the Railroad 
Commission of Texas.
(B) Independent Administration
Texas Probate Code, Section 145, et seq, provides for the independent 
administration of estates. The personal representative of the estate, known as the 
Independent Executor, is generally free of court control. Independent administration 
normally is found in estates where the decedent died testate but provisions in 
Section 145 are made for those who died intestate.
Title is immediately vested in the devisees under a will or the heirs at law of 
someone who dies intestate at the time of death; subject, however, to the payment 
of the debts of the deceased and the payment of court-ordered child support 
payments. Texas Probate Code, Section 37. However, the Independent Executor 
has the authority to sell the property of the decedent to pay debts of the estate, even 
without express authority in the will. Rowland v. Moore, 174 S.W .2d 248 (Tex. 1943). 
An oil and gas lease creates a determinable fee interest in the lessee and has long 
been held by the Texas courts to be a sale of an interest in land. Cherokee Water 
Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W .2d 522 (Tex. 1982).
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A question arises as to whether an Independent Executor has the authority to 
execute an oil and gas lease which binds the estate after all debts had been paid. 
Under the case of Dallas Services v. Broadmoor, 634 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Civ.App. - 
Dallas, 1982, re f 'd n.r.e.) and Section 188 of the Texas Probate Code, a lessee who 
is an innocent purchaser, in good faith for a valuable consideration and without 
notice of any illegality in the title, of an oil and gas lease from an Independent 
Executor during an administration is protected so long as the estate has not been 
closed.
(C) Dependent A dm in istra tion
Sections 367 and 368 of the Texas Probate Code give the procedures for 
obtaining an oil and gas lease subject to a dependent administration. This is the 
usual situation where someone dies intestate and there is an administration had on 
their estate.
(i) Section 367
An oil and gas lease can be obtained from a personal representative of an 
estate after an application has been filed as provided for in Section 367(c)1. Upon 
the filing of the application, the clerk is required to immediately call the filing of same 
to the court and the judge shall designate the time and place for hearing of the 
application. The personal representative, and not the county clerk, shall give notice 
in writing of the time designated by the Judge for the hearing on the application. The 
requirements of this notice are contained in Section 367(c)3(a). The personal 
representative shall give at least 10 days notice, exclusive of the date of notice and 
of the date set for hearing, by publication in one issue of a newspaper of general 
circulation in a county where the proceeding is pending. The above steps are 
mandatory in any order entered in the absence of these requirements is null and 
void. A hearing is then held and an appropriate order must be entered by the court.
Section 367 of the Texas Probate Code is rarely used because of Section 368.
(ii) Section 368
Provides that the court may authorize the making of an oil and gas lease at 
private sale (without public notice or advertising) if the court is of the opinion that 
sufficient facts are set out in the application to show that it would be more 
advantageous to the estate that a lease be made privately and without compliance 
of the mandatory requirements referenced above.
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At any time after the expiration of 5 days, and prior to expiration of 10 days 
from the date of filing the application, and without an order setting the time and place 
for a hearing, the court shall hear the application to lease. If it is satisfied the lease 
will be made for a fair and sufficient consideration and on fair terms, and that it will 
be made in conformity with law, the court shall enter an order authorizing the 
execution of such lease without the necessity of advertising, notice or citation. No 
order confirming the lease made at private sale need be issued. However, the lease 
will not be valid until the increased order additional bond required by the court, if 
any, has been approved by the court or filed with the clerk of the court.
Any lease authorized under either Section 367 or 368 of the Texas Probate 
Code shall have a primary term of no more than 5 years, subject to the terms and 
provisions of the lease extending it beyond the primary term by paying production, 
by bona fide drilling or reworking operations, whether in or on the same or additional 
well or wells, with no cessation of operations of more than 60 consecutive days 
before production is restored or obtained, or by the provisions of the lease relating 
to a shut-in gas well.
(D) Sale of Property o f a M inor by a Parent W ithout G uardianship
When the net value of a minor’s interest in real or personal property in an 
estate does not exceed $50,000.00, a natural or adoptive parent, or the managing 
conservator, of a minor who is not a ward, may apply to the court for an order to sell 
the real property of a minor in an estate without being appointed guardian. Section 
889 of the Texas Probate Code.
The contents of the application are set forth in Section 889(b). On receipt of 
the application, the court shall set the application for hearing at a date not earlier 
than 5 days from the date of the filing of the application. If the court is satisfied that 
the sale is in the best interest of the minor, the court shall order the sale of the 
property. The proceeds of the sale belonging to the minor are deposited in the court 
registry.
Section 890 of the Texas Probate Code governs the sale of property of a ward 
who has a guardian of the person but not a guardian of an estate. The requirements 
are substantially similar to Section 889.
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(E) Trustees
Unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise, Section 113.012 of the Texas 
Property Code (and a part of the Texas Trust Code) sets out a broad range of 
mineral transactions the trustee is authorized to enter into. This includes the power 
to make oil and gas leases, with pooling and unitization clauses, including the right 
to execute such a lease extending beyond the term of the trust.
If a conveyance is to a blind trustee with no identification of the trust or 
disclosure of the beneficiaries, the person designated as Trustee can convey the 
property without subsequent question by a person who claims to be a beneficiary of 
the trust. See Section 101.001 and Section 114.082 of the Texas Property Code.
(F) A tto rney-in -Facts  un der P ow er o f Attorneys
Section 490 of the Texas Probate Code sets out a statutory durable power of 
attorney form. This form is attached and is the form in effect since September 1, 
1997. If no power listed is crossed out, it is interpreted as a general power of 
attorney. Section 492 deals with construction of powers relating to real property 
transactions. These specifically include the power to enter into an oil and gas lease 
and making pooling and unitization agreements. Prior to September 1, 1997, the 
statute authorizing real estate transactions was valid for a conveyance of real 
property and authorized agents to otherwise “grant options concerning ... or 
otherwise dispose of an estate or interest in real property ....” A question existed 
as to whether the form authorized oil and gas transactions, especially if the form was 
executed to only grant specific powers and was not a general power of attorney.
It should be noted that a non-durable power of attorney or a durable power of 
attorney that does not substantially conform to this form, does not benefit from this 
provision. These forms should be looked at carefully to determine if they allow 
authority to execute oil and gas leases, with pooling provisions. W e do have an 
early case of Bean v. Bean, 79 S .W .2d  652 (Tex.Civ.App. - Texarkana 1935, writ 
ref d) which held that a power of attorney which gave authority to “sell” land did not 
include the power to convey minerals by either a deed or lease.
Section 489 of the Probate Code requires that a durable power of attorney 
requiring the execution of an instrument to be recorded, including an oil and gas 
lease, shall be recorded in the County Clerk’s Office where the land is located.
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IV. LIMITATIONS
Most, if not all states, have statutes which can be utilized in curing title defects 
or eliminating title requirements. These statutes are a practical necessity. The 
curative statutes regularly utilized by title examiners in Texas include the following:
(A) Section 16.033 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Technical Defects in Instruments
(i) A person with a right of action for the recovery of real property 
conveyed by an instrument with one of the following defects must bring 
suit not later than four years after the day the instrument was recorded 
with the county clerk of the county where the real property is located:
(a) lack of the signature of a proper corporate officer, partner, 
or company officer, manager, or member;
(b) lack of a corporate seal;
(c) failure of the record to show the corporate seal used;
(d) failure of the record to show authority of the board of 
directors or stockholders of a corporation, partners of a 
partnership, or officers, managers or members of a 
company;
(e) execution and delivery of the instrument by a corporation, 
partnership, or other company that had been dissolved, 
whose charter had expired, or whose franchise had been 
canceled, withdrawn or forfeited;
(f) acknowledgment of the instrument in an individual, rather 
than a representative or official, capacity;
(g) execution of the instrument by a trustee without record of 
the authority of the trustee or proof of the facts recited in 
the instrument;
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(h) failure of the record or instrument to show an 
acknowledgment or jurat that complies with applicable 
law; or,
(i) wording of the stated consideration that may or might 
create an implied lien in favor of the grantor.
(ii) This section does not apply to a forged instrument.
(B) Section 160.35 o f The Texas Civil Practice And Remedies Code
Lien on Real Property
(i) A person must bring suit for the recovery of real property under 
a real property lien or the foreclosure of a real property lien not 
later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.
(ii) A sale of real property under a power of sale in a mortgage or 
deed of trust that creates a real property lien must be made not 
later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.
(iii) The running of the statute of limitations is not suspended against 
a bona fide purchaser for value a lienholder, or a lessee who 
has no notice or knowledge of the suspension of the limitations 
period and who acquires an interest in the property when a cause 
of action on an outstanding real property lien has accrued for 
more than four years, except as provided by:
(1) Section 16.062, providing for suspension in the event of 
death; and,
(2) Section 16.036, providing for recorded extensions of real 
property liens.
(iv) On the expiration of the four-your limitations period, the real 
property lien and a power of sale to enforce the real property lien 
become void.
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(v) If a series of notes or obligations of a note or obligation payable 
in installments is secured by a real property lien, the four-year 
limitations period does not begin to run until the maturity date of 
the last note, obligation, or installment.
(vi) The limitations period under this section is not affected by 
Section 3.118, Business & Commerce Code.
(vii) In this section, “real property lien” means:
(1) a superior title retained by a vendor in a deed of 
conveyance or a purchase money note; or
(2) a vendor’s lien, a mortgage, a deed of trust, a voluntary 
mechanic’s lien, or a voluntary materialman’s lien on real 
estate, securing a note or other written obligation.
The foregoing limitation statute can be suspended by a proper written 
agreement. The maturity date in the original instrument or the extension is the 
conclusive evidence of the maturity date of the debt or obligation.
V. LIENS
A very common problem encountered in determining mineral ownership in a 
tract of land concerns the issue of whether a lien foreclosure has wiped out 
intervening or prior mineral sales.
(A) Deed of Trust Foreclosure
The most common situation concerns the deed of trust foreclosure. For 
example, say “A” owns Blackacre and executes a valid deed of trust covering this 
land to “B”. “A” then conveys an undivided 1/2 mineral interest in Blackacre to “C”. 
If “B” forecloses under the deed of trust in accordance with law, a sale of this type 
does eliminate the intervening mineral sale.
However, say “A” owns fee simple title to Blackacre. “A” then executes a deed 
of trust covering said land to “B”. Subsequently, “A” conveys an undivided 1/2 
mineral interest in Blackacre to “C”. Subsequently, “A” determines that he cannot pay 
the mortgage and conveys Blackacre to “B” for the stated consideration of 
satisfaction of the original debt. Note that this is not a foreclosure under a deed of 
trust but a deed executed in extinguishment of the debt. In this situation, the Texas
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courts holds that such a deed does not wipe out the intervening mineral sale to “C”. 
See Flag-Redfern Oil Company v. Humble Exploration Company, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 
6 (Tex. 1987). In the Flag-Redfern case, supra, the Court noted that Texas had 
always followed the lien theory of mortgages. In other words, when a mortgagor 
executes a deed of trust, the legal and equitable estates in the property are severed. 
The mortgagor retains the legal title and the mortgagee holds the equitable title. 
After the deed of trust, “A” would still be vested with the legal title and “B” would be 
vested with the equitable title. When “A” conveyed the undivided 1/2 mineral interest 
to “C”, it conveyed in fee simple the legal estate to an undivided 1/2 of the minerals. 
When “A” subsequently conveyed the property to “B”, the Court held that “A” did not 
hold the legal title to the 1/2 mineral interest as it had conveyed that estate to “C” 
and therefore, could not covey this legal title in 1/2 of them minerals back to “B”.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had erred in labeling the 
“A” to “C” deed a “deed in lieu of foreclosure” and that there is no such deed as a 
deed in lieu of foreclosure. It held that the deed was a warranty deed with the stated 
consideration being the cancellation and delivery of the note held by “C”.
(B) Vendor’s Lien And Recission
Vendor’s lien and recission cases can present a very sticky problem. You have 
to get all your facts straight in order to know exactly where you stand.
Let us assume “A” owns Blackacre in fee simple and sells the land to “B” for 
$10.00 and receives $5.00 in cash and a $5.00 vendor’s lien note. The deed recites 
that the vendor’s lien is retained to secure the payment of the debt. The Texas courts 
basically hold that this is an executory contract that ripens into title in the grantee 
when the remaining money has been paid. “B” then sells an undivided 1/2 mineral 
interest to “C”. Later, it is determined that “B” cannot pay the vendor’s lien note and 
he reconveys the land to “A” in cancellation of the vendor’s lien note. The courts hold 
that this is a recission and “C’”s mineral interest is wiped out by the deed. See 
Whiteside v. Bell, 347 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1961).
If “A” was not able to obtain a reconveyance from “B” but had to bring a lawsuit 
against “B” to foreclose his lien and get his title back, is “C” a necessary party to the 
suit? No. if “A” brings suit only against “B” and obtains the land back, “C”’s mineral 
interest is again wiped out because he is not a necessary party. I want to emphasize 
that this must be a vendor’s lien transaction because it involves an executory 
transaction and superior legal title remains in “A”.
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One thing you should be aware of is that the mineral buyer, “C”, is not left 
without a remedy in a situation where “B” reconveys the land back to “A” under a 
vendor’s lien situation. “C” has an equitable right of redemption and he can go back 
to the original landowner, tender the amount due and recover the title provided that 
he acts within a reasonable length of time. The only case I could find as to what was 
a reasonable time was the Whiteside case, supra, wherein the mineral buyer came 
back 27 years later. The court held that he did not come in within a reasonable 
amount of time and was barred by the operation of laches from redeeming his 
mineral interest.
SELECTED TITLE ISSUES IN TITLE EXAMINATION PAGE 20
APPENDIX I
STATUTORY DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD AND 
SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
ACT, CHAPTER XII, TEXAS PROBATE CODE. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS 
ABOUT THESE POWERS, OBTAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS 
DOCUMENT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAL AND OTHER 
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU. YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF 
ATTORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO.
I, (insert your name and address), appoint (insert the name and address of the 
person appointed), as my agent (attorney-in-fact) to act for me in any lawful way with 
respect to all of the following powers except for a power that I have crossed out 
below.
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, YOU MUST CROSS OUT EACH POWER 
WITHHELD.
Real property transactions;
Tangible personal property transactions;
Stock and bond transactions;
Commodity and option transactions;
Banking and other financial institution transactions;
Business operating transactions;
Insurance and annuity transactions;
Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions;
Claims and litigation;
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Personal and family maintenance;
Benefits from social security, Medicare, -Medicaid, or other governmental
programs or civil or military service;
Retirement plan transactions;
Tax matters.
IF NO POWER LISTED ABOVE IS CROSSED OUT, THIS DOCUMENT 
SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED AS A GENERAL POWER OF 
ATTORNEY AND MY AGENT (ATTORNEY IN FACT) SHALL HAVE THE POWER 
AND AUTHORITY TO PERFORM OR UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION I COULD 
PERFORM OR UNDERTAKE IF I WERE PERSONALLY PRESENT.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Special instructions applicable to gifts (initial in front of the following sentence 
to have it apply):
I grant my agent (attorney in fact) the power to apply my property to make 
gifts, except that the amount of a gift to an individual may not exceed the amount of 
annual exclusions allowed from the federal gift tax for the calendar year of the gift.
ON THE FOLLOWING LINES YOU MAY GIVE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 
LIMITING OR EXTENDING THE POWERS GRANTED TO YOUR AGENT.
UNLESS YOU DIRECT OTHERWISE ABOVE, THIS POWER OF 
ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL IT IS 
REVOKED.
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CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES BY CROSSING OUT 
THE ALTERNATIVE NOT CHOSEN:
(A) This power of attorney is not affected by my subsequent disability or 
incapacity.
(B) This power of attorney becomes effective upon my disability or 
incapacity.
YOU SHOULD CHOOSE ALTERNATIVE (A) IF THIS POWER OF 
ATTORNEY IS TO BECOME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE IT IS EXECUTED.
IF NEITHER (A) NOR (B) IS CROSSED OUT, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT 
YOU CHOSE ALTERNATIVE (A).
If Alternative (B) is chosen and a definition of my disability or incapacity is not 
contained in this power of attorney, I shall be considered disabled or incapacitated 
for purposes of this power of attorney if a physician certifies in writing at a date later 
than the date this power of attorney is executed that, based on the physician’s 
medical examination of me, I am mentally incapable of managing my financial 
affairs. I authorize the physician who examines me for this purpose to disclose my 
physical or mental condition to another person for purposes of this power of attorney. 
A third party who accepts this power of attorney is fully protected from any action 
taken under this power of attorney that is based on the determination made by a 
physician of my disability or incapacity.
I agree that any third party who receives a copy of this document may act 
under it. Revocation of the durable power of attorney is not effective as to a third 
party until the third party receives actual notice of the revocation. I agree to 
indemnify the third party for any claims that arise against the third party because of 
reliance on this power of attorney.
If any agent named by me dies, becomes legally disabled, resigns, or refuses 
to act, I name the following (each to act alone and successively, in the order named)
 as successor(s) to that agent:____________________________________
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STATE OF TEXAS §
COUNTY OF §
This document was acknowledged before me on the__day o f__________ ,
2001, by
Notary Public, State of Texas
THE ATTORNEY IN FACT OR AGENT, BY ACCEPTING OR ACTING UNDER THE 
APPOINTMENT, ASSUMES THE FIDUCIARY AND OTHER LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN AGENT.
Signed this_____ day o f______________________ , 2001.
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